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Bad Checks for the Price of Goods
William E. McCurdy*
A SELLER RECEIVES A CHECK from the buyer for the price of
goods. When presented to the bank on which it was drawn,
payment is refused. The buyer may, or may not, have had suf-
ficient funds on deposit at the time the check was drawn, but
insufficient when refused now although becoming sufficient imme-
diately after the check was presented. Or the buyer may have
known or have had reason to know that there would be insuffi-
cient funds to meet the check. Or the buyer never had an ac-
count at the bank. Or the one obtaining the goods may give a
fictitious name and indorse the check with that name. Or he
may impersonate another person and the check be a forgery.
What property, if any, is transferred to the buyer? May the seller
reclaim the goods from creditors of the buyer or even from a
bona fide purchaser for value and without notice (including
mortgagees and pledgees)? Is the answer in any, or all, of the
above situations that if the check is bad no property passes except
a wrongful possession? Does the property pass conditionally in
reference to the buyer and his general creditors? Does the
property pass subject only to avoidance for fraud (if present) on
equitable principles?
Transfer of Property in Goods from Seller to Buyer-
Development of Unconditional and Conditional
A sale of goods arises or results from an agreement whereby
the property' in the goods is transferred by seller to buyer for
a consideration termed the price.2 In the early English law pos-
* Visiting Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer Uni-
versity; Professor of Law, Emeritus, Harvard University.
1 By "property" is meant the general property in the goods and not a
special property interest (whatever its technical form) such as the interest
of a bailee, lessee, or security holder. Uniform Sales Act, § 76(1). The gen-
eral property may be legal (title) or equitable (beneficial). The special
interest may also be legal (title or possession) or equitable (contract lien).
2 Uniform Sales Act, § 1 (2). In the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57
Vict. ch. 71, § 1 (1) a sale to be within that statute requires "a money con-
sideration called the price." The American Act, § 9(2), provides that "the
price may be made payable in any personal property." The primary purpose
of the English Act was to codify and make certain for the "mercantile com-
munity" the existing common law. Although the American Act, recom-
mended for enactment in 1906 by the Commissioners on Uniform State
(Continued on next page)
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session and title to a chattel personal may have been considered
synonymous.3 During the 12th and 13th centuries not only was
delivery of the goods necessary for their transfer, but also pay-
ment of the price in whole or in part, or earnest money given
and received. By 1500 it would seem that delivery and payment
were not required if the property was transferred by deed, and
that delivery was dispensed with, without deed, if price or
earnest was paid; later, possibly by the 17th century, if express
credit (deferred payment) was agreed. By the 18th century, if
no express credit, implication of credit where the price was not
paid was sufficient.4 Certainly, by the early part of the 19th
century neither delivery nor payment was necessary to transfer
the property in goods from seller to buyer 5 although delivery re-
mained important to perfect the sale in respect to a subsequent
buyer from, or creditors of, a seller in possession.6
Although delivery and payment are not necessary for a sale
(transfer of the property), in a fully executed sales transaction
three elements are involved: transfer of property, delivery of
possession, and payment of price. If all three are to occur simul-
taneously and concurrently, either by requirement of law or of
agreement, the transaction is to be concluded on the spot (a spot
(Continued from preceding page)
Laws, and subsequently enacted in 34 states (including the District of Co-
lumbia), was based on the English Act, its primary purpose was to make
uniform the law, with few exceptions the existing common law, of the states
enacting it. See Report of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, pp. 15, 22
(1902). See also McCurdy, Some Differences between the English and the
American Law of Sale of Goods, 9 J. Comp. Leg. & Int'l. L. 1 (3d ser. 1927);
McCurdy, Uniformity and a Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 Va. L. Rev. 572-
582 (1940); Williston, Sales § 1 (Rev. ed. 1948). Thus the price need not be
paid, but only payable, that is it may rest in executory promise. See Uni-
form Commercial Code, § 2-106(1)-a present sale may be accomplished by
the making of the contract. Despite a few early English cases to the con-
trary, due to ambiguous wording, this has long been the general view where
the sale of goods section of the statute of frauds has been involved. A
barter has also generally been considered a sale both at common law and
under statutes of frauds in America. See Williston, op. cit. supra, §§ 56, 69.
Barter is included in the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial
Code, but not in the Sale of Goods Act.
3 Maitland, Seisin of Chattels, 1 L. Q. Rev. 324 (1885); Ames, Disseisin of
Chattels, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 313, 337 (1889).
4 See Williston, op. cit. supra, note 2, §§ 350, 350a for a full discussion.
5 Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn & Cress. 360 (K. B. 1827); Olyphant v. Baker,
5 Denio 379 (N. Y. 1848).
6 Knowles v. Horsfall, 5 B. & A. 134 (1821); Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass.
110 (1821); Sale of Goods Act, 1893, § 25(1); Uniform Sales Act, §§ 25, 26.
But see Johnson v. Credit Lyonnais, 3 C. P. D. 32 (1877); Meade v. Smith,
16 Conn. 346 (1844).
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BAD CHECKS FOR GOODS
transaction) and is termed a "cash sale." 7 If the property has
been transferred, but there has been neither delivery nor pay-
ment, delivery and payment are in the absence of agreement to
the contrary deemed concurrent, and the sale is one in which
the seller has a lien (a situation also sometimes termed "cash
sale") .s If delivery has been made pursuant to a sales agreement
but the seller reserves the property in the goods until concurrent
final payment, the transaction is a "conditional sale" 9 (a techni-
cal designation since all three of these situations could appropri-
ately be termed "conditional"). If, pursuant to the agreement,
transfer of property and delivery of possession have taken place,
only payment being deferred, the sale is (in legal terminology)
one on "credit" 10 (business terminology often uses the term
"credit" to include all types of sales except the first or strict
"cash sale"), and is unconditional.
Prior to the 18th century the spot cash transaction was prob-
ably the norm." By the end of that century and the early 19th
century the concepts of title and property and their transfer had
been fully separated from possession and delivery, and the norm
had become that of deferred delivery or payment or both (lien
or credit).12 Transfer of property between seller and buyer
(sale) had come to depend simply on mutual assent, and since
frequently no intention in this respect was expressly manifested
between the parties, rules for ascertaining intention developed
for typical situations.13 Thus in the case of an unconditional
transaction involving specific goods in a deliverable state the first
rule presumed that the parties intended the property to pass to
the buyer on the making of the contract although delivery or
7 Bussey v. Barnett, 9 M. & W. 312 (1842); Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H. 136 (1872).
8 Turner v. Benz Bros. & Co., 153 Wash. 123, 279 Pac. 398 (1929); Bishop v.
Shillito, 2 B. & A. 329 (1819). If it is agreed that the buyer may take de-
livery and pay later (negativing lien) and the buyer becomes insolvent, or
the time for payment has arrived, before delivery has occurred, payment
and delivery become concurrent conditions. McElwee v. Metropolitan
Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302 (6th Cir. 1895).
9 Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663 (1886).
10 Stephens-Franklin Motors v. Lambro, 71 Ariz. 389, 228 P. 2d 267 (1951).
11 Williston, op. cit. supra, note 2, § 260.
12 Ibid.
13 Lingham v. Eggleston, 27 Mich. 324 (1873), quoting Blackburn, Sales, 120.
These Rules for ascertaining intention in typical situations have the effect
of presumptions rebuttable by showing contrary intent. Williston, Sales
op. cit. supra, note 2, §§ 264, 265, 270, 273, 278, 279.
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payment or both were postponed. 14 Unless a different intention
appears this is the norm of the Sale of Goods Act 15 and of the
Uniform Sales Act.'0 However, unless otherwise agreed delivery
and payment are concurrent conditions (lien).17
Nevertheless, a sale may be intended to be conditional
other than in the concurrence of delivery and payment.' 8 De-
pending upon the manifested terms of the transaction the parties
may intend a true cash sale or a true conditional sale since
the right of possession or property, notwithstanding delivery,
may be reserved in the seller until certain conditions have
been fulfilled.19 The conditional sale is easily identified since
limitations upon delivery must be express.20 Because the true
cash sale is no longer the norm and such intention is rarely ex-
pressly stated, such a sale is not to be inferred except in the true
spot transaction,2 1 typical of which is the sale over the counter
in a retail store to a buyer who is not a credit customer.22 In
such cases the seller's assent is absent or not definitive until
the concurrent conditions have taken place (or until the parties
manifest a contrary intent) 23 and the property in the goods
has not passed to the buyer-if the buyer takes possession only
a wrongful possession has been obtained. Under similar circum-
stances the same result would follow where property has pre-
14 Tarling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360 (1827); Dixon v. Yates, 5 B. & A. 313, 340
(1833); Olyphant v. Baker, supra, note 5; Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450
(1874).
15 §§ 17 and 18, Rule 1.
16 §§ 18 and 19, Rule 1. And see also Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-401.
17 Sale of Goods Act, § 28; Uniform Sales Act, § 42.
18 Sale of Goods Act, § 1(2); Uniform Sales Act, § 1(3).
19 Sale of Goods Act, § 19(1); Uniform Sales Act, § 20(1).
20 Stephens-Franklin Motors v. Lambro, 71 Ariz. 389, 228 P. 2d 267 (1951);
Taylor v. Industrial Accident Comm., 30 Cal. Rptr. 877 (2d Dist. 1963).
21 Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H. 136 (1872). Cf. Bishop v. Shillito, supra, note 8.
An auction sale is usually regarded as a lien transaction. Clark v. Greely,
62 N. H. 394 (1882); Harris v. Merlino, 137 N. J. L. 717, 61 A. 2d 276 (1948).
22 Bussey v. Barnet, 9 M. & W. 312 (1842). In Koman v. Holtgreve, 207 Md.
85, 113 A. 2d 419 (1955) groceries and meat furnished customers to be paid
for later in the week were held to be sales on credit, and not cash sales.
See Williston, op. cit. supra, note 2, §§ 342, 343. But cf. Stone v. Perry, 60
Me. 48 (1872) where "terms cash" meant by usage payment within 10 days,
and it was held a cash sale. It would seem that if deferred payment had a
conditional effect, the transaction would be a conditional sale, or a con-
tractual (equitable) lien. See Taylor v. Gill Equipment Co., 87 Ga. App.
309, 73 S. E. 2d 755 (1952) and In the Matter of Smithdale Industries, Inc.
(bankrupt), 219 F. Supp. 862 (E. D. Tenn. 1963).
23 Williston, op. cit. supra, note 2, §§ 346, 346b; Williston and Thompson,
Contracts § 730 (1937).
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viously been transferred to the buyer but delivery and pay-
ment are to be concurrent.2 4 In the one case, the seller's title,
and in the other, his legal possessory right (lien)25 would afford
protection not only against the buyer and his creditors but also
against purchasers from the buyer even though bona fide and
for value.26
But if there is an appreciable interval of time, however
short, between the buyer's taking possession with the seller's
assent and expected payment where the seller is not in control
of the goods or equally in control with the buyer, the buyer has
presumably obtained with the seller's assent not only possession
but also the legal property in the goods. Thus in Island Trading
Co. v. Berg Bros.,27 it was held that if a seller delivers goods to
a buyer who promises to return immediately with cash, a sale
by the buyer instead to a bona fide purchaser for value is in-
defeasible.
Preconceived Intent Not to Pay the Price, and Fraud
The above discussion has assumed the absence of deception
on the part of the buyer. A misrepresentation, fraudulent or
material, may either induce or preclude mutual assent. In early
English law, misrepresentation (as distinguished from duress)
was not regarded as invalidating a transaction depending for legal
effect upon mutual assent.2 8 Ultimately the chancellor (later
equity courts) would relieve the deceived party, against the law
which upheld such unconscionably obtained advantage, by af-
24 Wiliston, op. cit. supra, note 2, § 625a; Williston and Thompson, op. cit.
supra, note 23, § 728.
25 Ames v. Moir, 130 Ill. 582, 22 N. E. 535 (1889); Bishop v. Shillito, supra,
note 8.
26 Turner v. Benz Bros. & Co., 153 Wash. 123, 125, 279 Pac. 398, 399 (1929).
27 239 N. Y. 229, 146 N. E. 345 (1925).
28 The common-law writ of deceit was apparently confined to frauds on the
court. It was later extended to frauds on a person by an action on the case
in the nature of deceit. 2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, 535-6,
(2d ed. 1952). Prior to Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51 (1789) this action was
available only in transactions induced by misrepresentation. That case ex-
tended the deceit action beyond transaction between the parties on a theory
of aggression, stressing among certain other requirements intent and knowl-
edge of falsity. In England and many American jurisdictions this action has
not been extended to honest but negligent misrepresentation. Heilbut,
Symons & Co. v. Buckleton [1913], A. C. 30. See Holmes, J., dissenting in
Nash v. Minnesota Title & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574, 40 N. E. 1039 (1895). In
some it has been so extended. Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N. W.
581 (1908); Weston v. Brown, 82 N. H. 157, 131 Atl. 141 (1925). See Willis-
ton & Thompson, op. cit. supra, note 23, § 1501.
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fording him in personam aid to regain his former position,29 and
avoid the transaction. If however the fraudulent party obtaining
a legal interest had transferred the interest to a bona fide pur-
chaser for value and without notice, the position of such pur-
chaser was not unconscionable and avoidance of his legal position
was not permitted. The equity of a defrauded seller to avoid or
rescind would thus be defeated by the legal interest not subject
to equity interference. 30 A misrepresentation (fraudulent or ma-
terial) 3 ' must however involve a matter of fact.32
In Earl of Bristol v. Wilsmore3 3 it was held, where the buyer
obtained possession of sheep with an undisclosed preconceived
intent never to pay their price, that there "would be such a
fraud as would vitiate the sale" and that the seller could maintain
the legal possessory action of trover. The result was reached not
simply because of the possible influence of the older cash sale
norm but because of the undeveloped concept of fraud.34 It was
not until the celebrated statement of Bowen, L. J., in Edgington
v. Fitzmaaurice,35 that a state of mind is just as much a fact as a
29 1 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, 189 (2d ed. 1952), 2 id. at
534-6; Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 173, 617 (2d ed.
1936); 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, §§ 15-29, 31, 899 (5th ed. 1941); 5
Williston and Thompson, op. cit. supra, note 23, § 1525; Williston, op. cit.
supra, note 2, § 624, 625a, 647. See also Ames, Purchase for Value without
Notice, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1887); Schwartz, The Bona Fide Purchaser Re-
visited: A Comparative Inquiry, 42 B. U. L. Rev. 403 (1962).
30 This is the historical and analytical explanation in English and American
law. Another view was held in some American cases that the bona fide
purchaser from a fraudulent person was protected on an estoppel theory.
Barnard v. Campbell, 55 N. Y. 456 (1873), reargument denied, 58 N. Y. 73
(1874); Parker v. Baxter, 86 N. Y. 586 (1881). But see Casey v. Kastel,
237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671 (1932). See also Van Duzor v. Allen, 90 Ill. 499(1878). This view was applied without reference to special facts other than
a sale to a fraudulent buyer.
31 Avoidance or rescission is generally available for material honest mis-
representation as well as for fraud. 5 Williston and Thompson, op. cit. supra,
note 23, §§ 1500, 1509; Williston, op. cit. supra, note 2, § 624.
32 See Restatement, Contracts, §§ 470 (what is misrepresentation), 471
(fraud, including concealment, and in some circumstances non-disclosure),
476 (frauds or non-fraudulent misrepresentation where material renders
transaction voidable). See also Williston and Thompson, op. cit. supra, note
23, § 1531.
Where consent is precluded (fraud is the factum) rather than induced
no transaction results (void). This is the case where one is led to believe
that he is entering no transaction or that the supposed transaction is an
entirely different one. Restatement, Contracts, § 475; 5 Williston and Thomp-
son, op. cit. supra, note 23, § 1488; Williston, op. cit. supra, note 2, § 625.
33 1 B. & C. 514 (1823).
34 See Williston, op. cit. supra, note 2, § 637; 5 Williston and Thompson,
op. cit. supra, note 23, §§ 1496, 1521.
35 29 Ch. D. 459 (C. A. 1885).
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state of digestion, that it became generally accepted that a mis-
representation of intent to perform is a misrepresentation of
fact, and thus one so representing may be subject to avoidance or
rescission or even to an action of deceit.
36
In White v. Garden,3 7 a case presenting the same problem as
in Earl of Bristol v. Wilsmore,3 s it was held that the sale was
voidable (not void) and the legal action could not be maintained
against a bona fide purchaser for value from the buyer, although
it could have been maintained against the buyer and anyone not
a bona fide purchaser. The nature of the seller's interest is
clearly recognized as equitable; curiously the relief may be in an
action at law. Both of these cases may have resulted not only
from the traditional disinclination of equity to deal with non-
unique chattels personal,3 9 but also from the expensive and dila-
tory equity of the time.40 Because of limited equity in some of
the colonies and early American states, equitable rescission by
a seller was available in a law action but only on equitable prin-
ciples.41 Later this approach seems to have become general.
42
36 In Gallagher v. Brunel, 6 Cow. 347 (N. Y. 1826) it was held that an un-
disclosed intent not to perform is not a misrepresentation of existing fact
and that an action of deceit will not lie. The case was later overruled. In
Swift v. Rounds, 19 R. I. 527, 35 Atl. 45 (1896), it was held that an action of
deceit would lie for preconceived intent not to pay. Cf. Burrill v. Stevens,
73 Me. 395 (1882). See also Adams v. Gillig, 199 N. Y. 314, 92 N. E. 670
(1930)-rescission; Charpentier v. Oil Co., 91 N. H. 38, 13 A. 2d 141 (1940)-
deceit; See also Zimmerman v. U. S., 171 F. 2d 790 (5th Cir. 1949); Robin &
Randler Coaches v. Turner [1947], 2 All E. R. 284. See further, Restate-
ment, Contracts, § 473, accord; and Note, 57 Dick. L. Rev. 143 (1953).
In California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F. 2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933)
commented on in 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1344, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 407, it was held
that extremely doubtful ability to pay is equivalent to an intent not to per-
form. Non-performance of a contractual promise however is not equivalent
to an intent at the time of the contract not to perform. McComb v. Brewer
Lumber Co., 184 Mass. 276, 68 N. E. 222 (1903). See also 3 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence, § 877d (5th ed. 1941).
37 10 C. B. 919 (1851).
38 Supra, note 33.
39 See In re Wait [1927], 1 Ch. 606 (C. A.). See also McCurdy, Sales Trans-
actions 54-64 (1959).
40 See Dickens, Bleak House (1853) preface and its fictional case of
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce. See also Plucknett, A Concise History of the Com-
mon Law 188, 189 (2d ed. 1936) for the effect of the Common Law Procedure
Act of 1854.
41 Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 307 (Mass. 1832) (action will not lie against
a bona fide purchaser for value); Thurston v. Blanchard, 22 Pick. 18 (Mass.
1839) (action of trover will lie against fraudulent buyer without demand
and refusal or offer to return as a condition to bringing action). See further
Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the American Colonies, in Select Essays in
Anglo-American Legal History 779 (1908); Fisher, The Administration of
(Continued on next page)
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Bad Checks. Condition or Fraud?
Where the buyer's note is taken by the seller for the price
of goods which are concurrently delivered, it is generally held
that the transfer of property is unconditional, and the goods can
be reclaimed only on equitable principles where there is fraud
or material misrepresentation.4 3 Unless there is an express con-
dition the sale is on credit.44 Where, however, the buyer's check
is immediately payable and45 is taken for goods46 contemporane-
(Continued from preceding page)
Equity through Common Law Forms in Pennsylvania, in Select Essays,
supra, at 810.
42 Mayer v. Thompson, 128 Miss. 561, 91 So. 275 (1922)-not available
against a bona fide purchaser for value; Elliott v. Federated Fruit & Vege-
table Growers, 108 Cal. App. 412, 291 Pac. 681 (1930)-trover against the
buyer. See also Glenn, Rescission for Fraud in Sale or Purchase of Goods
-Quasi Contractual Remedies as Related to Trover and Replevin, 22 Va.
L. Rev. 859 (1936).
43 Martin v. Green, 117 Me. 138, 102 Atl. 977 (1918). Where the buyer's
note or postdated check is taken for goods antecedently sold and delivered
on credit not only would the transfer not be conditional but any fraud
relating to the instrument would not make the transfer voidable. Cf. Wag-
ner Products Co. v. Adams, 258 S. W. 2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), com-
mented on in 32 Texas L. Rev. 622 (1954), (postdated check taken in lieu of
prior contemporaneous check).
The N. I. L. § 12 provides that a non-fraudulent post-dated check is not
invalid. It generally has the effect of a note. See Brannan, Negotiable
Instruments Law 230 (Beutel's 6th ed. 1938). See also Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 3-114.
44 Where a party's negotiable instrument is taken for a pre-existing or
contemporaneously created obligation, the instrument may be taken as pay-
ment or as conditional payment. In the absence of expressed intention,
conditional payment is presumed in all but a few jurisdictions which pre-
sume unconditional payment. The negotiable obligation may be taken in
lieu of or as an absolute substitution of the antecedent obligation (accord
and satisfaction) or in lieu of the simple obligation to pay the price of
goods concurrently sold and delivered (merger). If taken as payment, the
negotiable obligation is the only right available to the seller, unless he was
fraudulently induced to take it. If conditional payment, the original obliga-
tion is suspended until dishonor. The debt, however, may be discharged by
seller's lack of diligence in collection. See 6 Williston and Thompson, op. cit.
supra, note 23, §§ 1875 F, 1875 G, 1875 H; 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1284 (1962
ed.). The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law contains no provision con-
cerning this matter. It is discussed however in Brannan, op. cit. supra, note
43, 895, 1128, in connection with sections 88 and 185 of the N. I. L. See also
Daniel, Negotiable Instruments, § 1458 (7th ed. 1933); Wilbank v. James
Talcott, Inc., 106 Ga. App. 770, 128 S. E. 2d 333 (1962). The Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 3-802, contains an express provision.
45 An unindorsed check of a third person is not presumed to be conditional.
Durant Milling Co. v. Hall, 284 S. W. 2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
46 The seller may refuse the buyer's check for justifiable cause. Rossville
Salvage Corp. v. S. E. Graham Co., 319 F. 2d 391 (3d Cir. 1963). If the
buyer takes the goods notwithstanding without the seller's assent, such a
case would involve the same principle as that in Bishop v. Shillito, supra,
note 8, and Ames v. Moir, supra, note 25. See Maxherman, Inc. v. Alper, 210
App. Div. 389, 206 N. Y. S. 233 (1924).
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ously delivered without express condition 47 (when otherwise
concurrent passage of title and/or delivery would be intended)
and the check is dishonored on due presentment, there are two
principal views as to the effect of dishonor upon the transfer of
property in the goods.48
In Sullivan Co. v. Larson 49 where the buyer's check was re-
turned by the bank marked "insufficient funds" it was held that
indefeasible legal title passed to a bona fide purchaser for value
from the buyer.50 In an earlier Nebraska case, it was held that
dishonor of a certified check as a forgery would not as a matter
of law affect the title of a bona fide purchaser for value, the
court saying: "The essential thing in the passing of title to per-
sonal property is that the vendor and the vendee intend that the
title shall pass, and not what induced them to have that inten-
tion. But one who has been induced by fraud to part with title
. . . may rescind the contract and recover back the property
while title still remains in the fraudulent vendee, but he cannot
recover it when title has passed to a bona fide purchaser for
value." 51 And in Sullivan v. Wells, 52 where the buyer's check
was returned for insufficient funds, the court considered the real
question to be: "Did the seller assent to transfer the ownership in
the goods? It can hardly be doubted that he did . . .But where
47 Sykes v. Carmack, 211 Ark. 288, 202 S. W. 2d 761 (1947); Pugh v. Camp,
213 Ark. 282, 210 S. W. 2d 120 (1948); Ohio Motors, Inc. v. Russell Willis,
Inc., 193 Tenn. 524, 246 S. W. 2d 962 (1952); Fisher v. Bullington, 233 La.
368, 65 So. 2d 880 (1953). See Hurwitz v. Carpenzano, 329 Mass. 702, 110
N. E. 2d 367 (1953), 33 B. U. L. Rev. 47 (1953)--check taken on express con-
dition that title was not to pass until check paid, held conditional sale; but
contra, Slaton v. Lamb, 260 Ala. 494, 71 So. 2d 289 (1954); Johnson Motor
Co. v. Sims, 37 Ala. App. 548, 72 So. 2d 124 (1954).
48 The effect of the negotiable instrument as conditional payment has no
direct or necessary application to the question of whether transfer of prop-
erty in goods, for the price of which the negotiable instrument is given, is
also conditional. The problems are entirely dissimilar. See Williston, op.
cit. supra, note 2, § 346a; 3 Williston & Thompson, op. cit. supra, note 23,
§ 732. In Casey v. Gallagher, 326 Mass. 746, 96 N. E. 2d 709 (1951) it was
held where a check is taken transfer of property is presumably conditional.
In Massachusetts, however, a negotiable instrument was presumably pay-
ment in respect to an obligation. The difference between obligation and
property transfer is not always observed. See Wilson v. Commercial Fi-
nance Co., 239 N. C. 349, 79 S. E. 2d 908 (1954); Carrow v. Weston, 247 N. C.
735, 102 S. E. 2d 134 (1958); Wilbank v. James Talcott, Inc., 106 Ga. App.
770, 128 S. E. 2d 333 (1942). An assumed analogy may have influenced the
conditioned property transfer approach.
49 149 Neb. 97, 30 N. W. 2d 460 (1948).
50 See also Sullivan Co. v. Wells, 89 F. Supp. 317 (D. Nebr. 1950).
51 108 Neb. 801, 803, 189 N. W. 281, 282 (1922).
52 Supra, note 50.
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the seller is induced to part with his property by fraud, the
voidable title of the fraudulent buyer becomes an indefeasible
title upon a bona fide purchase for value from the fraudulent
buyer." 53
The second view holds the transfer of property in the goods
conditional irrespective of fraud. In Young v. Harris-Cortner
Co.,54 at time of delivery of cotton the buyer gave two checks,
payment of which was refused for insufficient funds, the buyer
meanwhile having sold the goods to a bona fide purchaser for
value. It was held that the seller could replevy the cotton, there
being no lack of diligence in presenting the checks for payment,
the court saying: "Looking to the intention of the parties, which
is the governing principle, we are satisfied that . . . it was con-
templated by the parties that the exchange of the cotton for the
cash were to be concurrent acts, and an extension of credit . . .
was never in the minds of the parties." 55
In commenting upon this view the court in Sullivan Co. v.
Wells characterized the approach that a worthless check is no
payment as "obviously unsound," the real question being whether
the seller assented to the transfer of ownership in the goods,
and "it can hardly be doubted that [he] did." 56
In the absence of express or clearly implied intent of the
parties not to transfer ownership, it would seem that the condi-
tional view is indeed unsound. If, as in Island Trading Co. v.
Berg Bros.57 the buyer obtains ownership where delivery was
pursuant to his promise to get and bring cash immediately, it
53 Id. at 319, citing, Williston, op. cit. supra, note 2, § 346a; Crescent Chevro-
let Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa 1074, 300 N. W. 260 (1941); and Nebraska cases.
See Commercial Credit Co. v. Click, 127 Ore. 130, 271 Pac. 36 (1928); Pettus
v. Powers, 185 S. W. 2d 872 (Mo. App. 1945) commented on in 13 Mo. L.
Rev. 211 (1948); Winter v. Miller, 183 F. 2d 151 (10th Cir. 1950); Pingleton
v. Shepherd, 219 Ark. 473, 242 S. W. 2d 971 (1951) commented on in 3 Hast.
L. J. 162 (1952). See also Sykes v. Carmack, 211 Ark. 288, 202 S. W. 2d 761
(1947); Guckeen Farmers Elev. Co. v. South Soo Grain Co., 172 Neb. 426,
109 N. W. 2d 728 (1962); Gen. Credit Corp. v. Bill Olsen's Motor, Inc., 147
Colo. 227, 363 P. 2d 489 (1962); Adams v. Greeson, 300 F. 2d 555 (10th Cir.
1962) (although express); Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So. 2d 477 (1957);
Jeffrey Motor Co. v. Higgins, 230 La. 857, 89 So. 2d 369 (1956).
54 152 Tenn. 15, 268 S. W. 125 (1925).
55 Id. at 17, 268 S. W. at 126. The case has been followed in Tennessee.
Cowan v. Thompson, 25 Tenn. App. 130, 152 S. W. 2d 1036 (1941), commented
on in 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 272 (1942). Cf. Harbert v. Fort Smith Canning Co.,
134 Kan. 240, 5 P. 2d 849 (1931)-purchaser from the buyer found not bona
fide.
56 Supra, note 50 at 319.
57 239 N. Y. 229, 146 N. E. 345 (1924).
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would seem that the same result would obtain if the buyer upon
delivery tells the seller to go get the buyer's cash and the seller
agrees to do so. In this respect the check amounts to nothing
more. There is usually a longer time interval contemplated. De-
ferred credit, however short in time, is inherent.5 8
In Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., the court advanced an addi-
tional reason: 59 "A farmer brings his cotton, tobacco, or wheat
to town for sale and sells same, and, as a general rule, is paid by
check, although all of such sales are treated as cash transactions.
If, in such a case, the purchaser can immediately resell to an
innocent party and convey good title, it would follow that ven-
dors would refuse to accept checks and would require the actual
money, which would result in great inconvenience and risk to
merchants engaged in buying such produce since it would re-
quire them to keep on hand large sums of actual cash. This
would result in revolutionizing the custom of merchants in such
matters." It is doubtful if the use of checks has been cur-
tailed in jurisdictions following the contrary view.60 Merchants
are not likely to think in terms of protection against remote
purchasers but rather, if dubious, upon inquiry and investiga-
tion of the buyer's substance and credit. 1'
In many cases purporting to follow the presumption of con-
ditional transfer view,6 2 it has been or could have been found
5s See Ward v. Parker, 151 So. 2d 108 (La. App. 1963).
Where a party's negotiable instrument is taken presumably as conditional
payment for an obligation, the obligation is suspended pending payment.
It is generally said however that where the instrument is taken for goods
(circumstances indicating a cash sale) the transfer of the property is prece-
dently conditional upon the instrument being honored. From this it would
follow that whether the check is bad or good the transfer is still conditional.
But it is not applied when the check proves good. Mullen v. Farm Bureau
and County Mutual Casualty Co., 21 Ill. App. 2d 280, 157 N. E. 2d 679 (1959).
See further Williston, Sales, § 346a (Rev. ed. 1948).
59 Supra, note 54 at 18, 268 S. W. at 127.
60 A priori assumptions may prove unsound. Cf. Crownhart, J. in Wick v.
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 265, 212 N. W. 787 (1927).
61 See Amols v. Bernstein, infra, note 106, and Phillips v. Brooks, infra,
note 92.
62 This view is often said to represent the weight of case authority. See in
accord with this view Gose v. Brooks, 229 S. W. 979 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921),
commented on in 35 Harv. L. Rev. 212 (1921); Bustin v. Craven, 57 N. M.
724, 263 P. 2d 932 (1953); Flatte v. Kossman Buick Co., 265 S. W. 2d 643
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954); McRae v. Bandy and O'Neal, 270 Ala. 12, 115 So. 2d
479 (1960).
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that the transfer was intended to be unconditional 3 or that there
was a later waiver of the condition, 4 or that the seller was
estopped. 5 In some it appeared that the transferee from the
buyer was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. 0
In South San Francisco Packing & Provision Co. v.
Jacobsen, 7 a check for the price given at time of delivery was
refused payment for lack of funds. At the time the check was
given the drawer's bank balance was sufficient. Meanwhile the
buyer had resold the goods through a "factor" who held the
fund which had been realized. It was found that there had
been no fraud, but that delivery and payment were to be simul-
taneous: therefore, as between the parties no title had passed.
Thus the seller was entitled to claim the fund over the general
creditors.68
63 See Wolfe v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 136, 55 S. E. 2d 675 (1949); Volusia Dis-
count Co. v. Alexander K-F Motors, 88 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1956); Kelsoe v.
Grouskay, 70 Ariz. 152, 217 P. 2d 915 (1950). See also Commonwealth v.
Manooshian, 326 Mass. 514, 95 N. E. 2d 659 (1950)-check in excess of the
price, the seller giving the buyer "change." Cf. Snyder v. Lincoln, 156 Neb.
190, 55 N. W. 2d 614 (1952)-acceptance of personal check when contract
required cash or certified check.
See also Casey v. Gallagher, 326 Mass. 746, 96 N. E. 2d 709 (1951);
Gerbe v. Pike, 249 S. W. 2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Stephen Burns, Inc.
v. Trantham, 305 S. W. 2d 66 (Mo. App. 1957); Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Ponce, 17 Wis. 2d 281, 116 N. W. 2d 252 (1962) (Oklahoma law construed to
apply conditional view only when check is for full amount, not for part
only); Valley Stockyards Co. v. Kinsel, 369 S. W. 2d 19 (Texas 1963).
64 Pohl v. Johnson, 179 Minn. 398, 229 N. W. 555 (1930) (undue delay in
presenting check); Motres de Mexicali, S. A. v. Bank of America, 227 F. 2d
643 (9th Cir. 1955) (undue delay in repossessing goods). Cf. Engstrom v.
Benzel, 191 F. 2d 689 (9th Cir. 1951), commented on in 37 Corn. L. Q. 477
(1952) (where check was ultimately paid).
See Williston, Sales, § 346b (Rev. ed. 1948). The Uniform Commercial
Code, 3-503(2) has replaced the concept of reasonable time for presentment
to a presumed reasonable time of 30 days in respect to drawer of a check
and 7 days in respect to an indorser. These times refer to discharge and
would not, it would seem, qualify 2-401 (1) and 2-511, infra, notes 75 and 76.
65 Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, supra, note 53; Commercial Finance
Corp. v. Burke, 173 Ore. 341, 145 P. 2d 473 (1944); Plummer v. Kingsley, 190
Ore. 378, 226 P. 2d 297 (1951) (Washington); Watson Bros. Realty Co. v.
Associates Discount Corp., 246 Iowa 483, 66 N. W. 2d 384 (1955). See also
Central Nat. Bank v. Rich, 256 N. C. 324, 123 S. E. 2d 811 (1962); McKee v.
Peterson, 29 Cal. Reptr. 742 (1st Dist. 1963).
66 Davidson v. Conner, 254 Ala. 38, 46 So. 2d 832 (1950); Holt Motors, Inc. v.
Casto, 136 W. Va. 284, 67 S. E. 2d 432 (1951); Commercial Credit Corp. v.
McGriff, 66 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1953). Cf. South Seattle Auto Auction, Inc. v.
LeRoy Ladd, etc. Ltd., 230 Ore. 350, 370 P. 2d 630 (1962).
67 183 Cal. 131, 190 Pac. 628 (1920), commented on in 9 Calif. L. Rev. 78
(1920), 91 Cent. L. J. 260 (1920), 30 Yale L. J. 198 (1920).
68 In McKee v. Peterson, supra, note 65, it was held that a seller delivering
a bill of sale and an automobile title certificate to the buyer was estopped
(Continued on next page)
May, 1964
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss2/6
BAD CHECKS FOR GOODS
It has been frequently said in the cases where bona fide
purchasers are not involved, that the property transfer is con-
ditional between the parties." In some cases it has been in-
timated and in a few held that the condition would not affect a
bona fide purchaser without notice. 0 It would seem, generally,
that the "conditional-between-the-parties" formula is not so
limited.7 1
In Blount v. Bainbridge7 2 it was held that while transfer
of property is conditional between the parties the seller is
estopped from reclaiming the goods from a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice, delivery to the buyer being sufficient
"external indicia" of the buyer's right to sell. 73 An automobile
(Continued from preceding page)
from reclaiming the automobile from a bona fide purchaser for value. Al-
though the property transfer is said to be conditional between seller and
buyer, a bona fide purchaser would not prevail over the seller absent
estoppel. California cases were elaborately reviewed. See Clark v. Hamilton
Diamond Co., 209 Cal. 1, 28 P. 2d 915 (1930).
69 See Weddington v. Boshammer, 237 N. C. 556, 75 S. E. 2d 530 (1953)
(funds deposited after seller "rescinded"); Hickerson v. Con Frazier Buick
Co., 264 S. W. 2d 29 (1953); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. McCollum,
207 F. 2d 768 (10th Cir. 1953) (New Mexico).
70 See Parker v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 229 N. C. 527, 50 S. E. 2d
304 (1948) where it appeared that the buyer had died before the dishonored
check was presented and it was held that the deceased buyer's "agent"
lacked authority to resell. See also Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, supra,
note 53.
71 Supra, note 68.
72 79 Ga. App. 99, 53 S. E. 2d 122 (1949).
73 The court regarded the result reached as settled by the Georgia cases
quoting from Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873, 875, 189 S. E.
713, 714 (1936), where it was said "It has been many times stated, and from
practical necessity in the transaction of business should be adhered to, that
possession of personal chattels, by virtue of which such person has been
given dominion and control over the property as if it were his own, carries
with it the presumption of ownership and consequent right of disposition of
such chattel." This was regarded in that case as a special application of
Georgia Code § 37-113 (estoppel). Code § 96-207 was also considered ap-
plicable (divesting-where one gives another evidence and indicia of right
to dispose).
Code § 37-113 provided: "When one of two innocent persons must suffer
by the act of a third person, he who put it in the power of the third person
to inflict the injury shall bear loss." See Smith v. Norman Motors, 84 Ga.
App. 86, 65 S. E. 2d 699 (1951); Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Thomas,
96 Ga. App. 279, 99 S. E. 2d 711 (1957); Cook Motor Co. of Panama City, Inc.
v. Richardson, 103 Ga. App. 129, 118 S. E. 2d 502 (1961). See also Peoples
Loan & Finance Corp. of Rome v. McBurnette, 100 Ga. App. 4, 110 S. E. 2d
32 (1959) (not a check case). In many of the Georgia cases the seller had
delivered to a buyer who was a dealer, or had given him a bill of sale, or
title certificate.
In McRae v. Bandy & O'Neal, 270 Ala. 12, 115 So. 2d 479 (1960) it was
held that Georgia law operated only in Georgia in an automobile sale, but
a later sale by the buyer in Alabama was governed by Alabama law which
did not protect a bona fide purchaser.
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had been sold at auction to a dealer. The court held that the
condition applies only between the parties. The result is indis-
tinguishable from the view of a sale being voidable for fraud
(indeed the court so characterized it), except that even in the
absence of fraud a buyer's transferee who was not bona fide
would not prevail.
The view that the property transfer is conditional only as
between seller and buyer would protect the seller against the
buyer and his general creditors, which the approach of uncondi-
tional credit transfer would not do in the absence of fraud. This
result can be supported on a theory of equitable lien.7 4
Effect of Sales Acts
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that any reserva-
tion of title in goods "delivered to the buyer is limited in effect
to a reservation of a security interest" 75 and that payment by
check (subject to the provisions of Section 3-802) is "conditional
and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check
on due presentment." 76
Neither the Sale of Goods Act nor the Uniform Sales Act
has express provisions concerning the effect of accepting a check
for the price. Provisions that a sale may be absolute or con-
ditional77 and that the seller may by the terms of the contract
reserve the right of possession or property notwithstanding de-
livery 8 have been referred to above.7 9 Both statutes provide
that in the case of specific goods the property passes according
to the intention of the partiesS" and they enact rules for ascer-
taining intention "unless a different intention appears" [setting
forth typical situations]. These rules developed as presumptions
at common law, and were carried into the statutes as such;"'
but some courts have applied these rules only after attempting
74 Cf. Engstrom v. Benzel, 191 F. 2d 689 (9th Cir. 1951); 37 Corn. L. Q. 477
(1952) and see supra, note 22. See also McCurdy, Sales Transactions 181-
185 (1959).




79 Supra, text at notes 19 and 20.
80 Sale of Goods Act, § 17; Uniform Sales Act, § 18.
81 Sale of Goods Act, § 18; Uniform Sales Act, § 19.
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to find intention independently.8 2 Although statutory treatment
of the effect of a check is lacking, 3 consideration of the sections,
taken together, shows that the cash sale is not considered the
norm. Nevertheless in Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., where the
sale was by a farmer to a cotton broker the court after quoting
sections 18(1) and (2) and 19 (1) of the Uniform Sales Act
said: "Upon principle we are unable to distinguish the instant
case from that of a sale made over the counter where the seller
was induced to accept a check as cash . . .the title not passing
until the condition (the payment of the check) is complied
with .... ,, 84 Cases arising under the Sales Act have not al-
ways fully considered its effect.8 5 Some, however, have held that
no change has been made in the common law.8 6 In Winter v.
Miller,87 it was held that § 19 Rule 1 was contrary to the pre-
vious conditional view. Both the English and American Acts
enact the general common law that a buyer from a seller who
is not the owner acquires no better title than the seller had
unless the owner is estopped or has given the seller actual or
apparent authority,8 but that a buyer in good faith, for value,
and without notice from a seller having an unavoided voidable
title acquires a good title.8 9
The Sale of Goods Act re-enacted 90 a provision of the Factors
Act of 188991 to the effect that where a buyer obtains possession
with the consent of the seller, any subsequent sale or other
82 See e.g. Automatic Time Table Advertising Co. v. Automatic Time Table
Co, 208 Mass. 252, 94 N. E. 462 (1911); Handley Motor Co., Inc. v. Wood, 237
N. C. 318, 75 S. E. 2d 312 (1953).
83 Supra, note 77, 78, 80 and 81.
84 Supra, note 54 at 17, 268 S. W. at 126.
85 E.g. Handley Motor Co., Inc. v. Wood, 237 N. C. 318, 75 S. E. 2d 312
(1953); see also Handley Motor Co. v. Wood, 238 N. C. 468, 78 S. E. 2d 391(1953) where the court refers to §§ 18 and 23 of the Sales Act but makes no
mention of § 19. The conditional transfer view was thought to follow from
the two sections considered.
86 Such decisions are usually those following the full conditional or con-
ditional-between-the-parties views. Edwards v. Central Motor Co., 38 Tenn.
App. 577, 277 S. W. 2d 413 (1955); Keegan v. Lenzie, 171 Ore. 194, 135 P. 2d
717 (1943), commented on in 42 Mich. L. Rev. 328 (1943); Crescent Chevro-
let Co. v. Lewis, supra, note 53.
87 183 F. 2d 151 (10th Cir. 1950).
88 Sale of Goods Act, § 21; Uniform Sales Act, § 23.
89 Sale of Goods Act, § 23; Uniform Sales Act, § 24.
90 § 25(2).
91 52 & 53 Vict. ch. 45, § 9. This provision limits the operation of a true
conditional sale. See McCurdy, Sales Transactions 483 (1959).
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disposition by the buyer to a purchaser in good faith and for
value shall have the same effect as though the seller had ex-
pressly authorized such sale or disposition. In Phillips v. Brooks,
Ltd.,92 a buyer of jewelry in a retail store fraudulently gave the
seller a worthless check and then pawned the jewelry to a
bona fide lender. It was held that the lender received a good
title against the jeweler. The possible conditional effect of the
check was not even mentioned. There is no provision in the
Uniform Sales Act corresponding to § 25(2) of the English
statute.03
Impersonation and Criminal Conduct of the Buyer
There remains to be considered the effect of impersonation
or criminal conduct.
Impersonation has been regarded as a question of parties
as well as of fraud. In a transaction face to face the intent is
said to be to deal with the person present and not with the one
impersonated, the motive being to deal with the latter.94 The
seller's assent is induced by fraud, the impersonating buyer ob-
taining a voidable title.95 There would be however a lack of
mutual assent for want of parties if a person obtains goods by
fraudulently representing himself as an agent instead of buyer.9 6
Face to face impersonation would not affect any of the views
taken as to the conditional effect of a bad check given by the
impersonator, unless the impersonation was considered criminal
and the criminal conduct was thought to qualify the voidable
92 [1919] 2 K. B. 243.
93 See Uniform Commercial Code, 2-401 (1) and 2-511(3), supra, notes 75,
76.
94 See Williston, Sales § 635 (Rev. ed. 1948) and 5 Williston and Thompson,
Contracts § 1517 (1937) where it is said that the "primary" intent is to deal
with the person present, there being a double intent, both of which cannot
operate.
95 Edmunds v. Merchants' Dispatch Transportation Co., 135 Mass. 283
(1883); Martin v. Green, 117 Me. 138, 102 Atl. 977 (1918); Phelps v. Mc-
Quade, 220 N. Y. 232, 115 N. E. 441 (1917); Phillips v. Brooks, Ltd., supra,
note 92.
96 Rodliff v. Dallinger, 141 Mass. 1, 4 N. E. 805 (1886); Chiplock v. Stewart
Motor Co., 91 A. 2d 851 (D. C. 1952); Hardman v. Booth, 1 H. & C. 803
(1863). Cf. Stoddard v. Ham, 129 Mass. 383 (1880); Russell Willis, Inc. v.
Page, 213 S. C. 156, 48 S. E. 2d 627 (1948), commented on in 23 Tul. L. Rev.
420 (1949). Cf. Rhode v. Ray Waits Motors, Inc., 223 S. C. 160, 74 S. E. 2d
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title view. 7 If the transaction is not face to face but by cor-
respondence, the intent is said to be to deal with the supposed
writer, the motive being the receipt of a letter written by the
impersonator.0 8 Thus there would be lack of mutual assent and
the buyer would obtain no title, and could not pass a good title
to a bona fide purchaser. 99 If such imposter sent a check sup-
posedly of the impersonated person, the result would follow
regardless of the view taken of either the conditional or crimi-
nal effect of a check. Except in the agency case, defect of
parties seems logically weak. The question of parties alone would
rarely be material. Both types of impersonation are usually
concerned with obtaining false credit. It may be more difficult
to detect impersonation at a distance, and the seller may re-
quire more protection. For this reason, irrespective of the ef-
fect of a check, the distinction between the types of impersona-
tion may be persuasive.
Statutes may include in the term "larceny" other related
offenses, such as embezzlement and obtaining property by false
pretenses. At common law larceny required a taking from the
possession of another without his consent and with intent to
steal. Larceny was subsequently extended to larceny by trick
(possession obtained by trick) and by breaking bulk (by bailee)
from which embezzlement is probably derived. It was not ex-
tended to cases where title was obtained by trick or fraud, but
this came to be dealt with by statute as obtaining goods by false
pretenses. 100 All these related offenses may be broadly termed
theft. At common law it was axiomatic that a thief could not
pass a good title even to a bona fide purchaser for value, since
a common-law thief obtained only wrongful possession.1 1
97 Even if impersonation is distinguished from assumption of a fictitious
name. See Dresden v. Roy Wilmett Co., 118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N. E. 2d 260
(1948).
The N. I. L. distinguishes use of a fictitious name from impersonation:
§ 9(3)-impersonation; §§ 61, 82(2), 114(2), 115(1), 130-fictitious persons.
See also Uniform Commercial Code, 3-401, 404, 405.
98 See Williston, Sales, op. cit. supra, note 94, § 635 and 5 Williston and
Thompson, op. cit supra, n. 94, § 1517, where it is said that, although there
is a double intent, the "primary" intent is to deal with the supposed writer.
99 Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 A. C. 459 (1879). The same distinctions are usually
made in transactions other than sales of goods, particularly in negotiable
instruments. See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 76, 84 (1920).
100 Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 396, 398-99 (2d ed.
1936).
101 In early common law a sale in market overt of stolen goods passed in-
defeasible title to a bona fide purchaser. This doctrine is enacted in the
(Continued on next page)
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The English Larceny Act, including related offenses in the
term larceny, has been construed as observing the above dis-
tinctions.10 2 In Phillips v. Brooks, Ltd.,1°  where an imposter-
a "fraudulent person" claiming to be another-purchased a ring
in a jewelry store and gave a check signing the name of the
supposed buyer as maker, the matter of criminality was not
mentioned, the court holding that the "swindler" had obtained
property so as to "entitle him" to give a good title to a bona
fide pledgee.
Under another type statute a different result has been
reached. In Richardson v. Seattle-First National Bank, 04 an
applicable statute included in larceny the obtaining of goods
by impersonation and provided that goods so obtained should
be returned to the true owner. 10 5
In Amols v. Bernstein,10 6 however, it was held more broadly
that criminal conduct would make a transfer to a bona fide
pledgee defeasible. It appeared that a face to face imposter pre-
tending to be another person of good credit obtained from a
jeweler a ring for $900 giving another ring in trade and a check
for the balance ($500) signing the check with the name of the
supposed buyer. The ring given in trade had been similarly
obtained elsewhere. The court, distinguishing Phelps v. Mc-
Quade,10 7 placed its decision on the reasoning of common-law
(Continued from preceding page)
Sale of Goods Act, § 22. However, by § 24 notwithstanding market overt
the owner is restored to his property after the thief has been prosecuted
to conviction. Market overt did not obtain in the United States. Williston,
op. cit. supra, note 94, § 347. § 24 of the English Act expressly provides that
where the goods are obtained by fraud or other wrongful means not amount-
ing to larceny a criminal conviction does not affect the title of a bona fide
purchaser.
107 Folkes v. King [1923], 1 K. B. 282 (C. A.); Heap v. Motorists' Advisory
Agency, Ltd. [1923], 1 K. B. 577; Lowther v. Harris [1927], 1 K. B. 393.
Cf. Lake v. Simmons [1927], A. C. 487, and Pearson v. Rose & Young, Ltd.
[1951], 1 K. B. 275 (C. A.).
103 Supra, note 92.
104 38 Wash. 2d 314, 229 P. 2d 347 (1951), commented on in 27 Wash. L.
Rev. 66 (1952).
105 Cf. Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 196 Pac. 13 (1921) where it was held
that if a buyer obtains goods by giving in exchange other goods which he
had stolen, the transfer of the goods so obtained to a bona fide purchaser
would be indefeasible. The applicable statute defined larceny as including
obtaining goods by false pretenses.
106 214 App. Div. 469, 212 N. Y. S. 518 (1925), commented on in 26 Col. L.
Rev. 636 (1926), 11 Corn. L. Q. 422 (1926), 39 Harv. L. Rev. 904 (1926), 74
U. Pa. L. Rev. 749 (1926).
107 Supra, note 95 (impersonation, no check involved).
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larceny (apparently larceny by trick)10 and common-law-forg-
ery (a felony).109 It is to be noted that the buyer's conduct would
amount to larceny by trick only if the full conditional property
view of the effect of the check were held, in which case crimi-
nality would add nothing.110 The relevance of forgery is not
apparent;"' it would seem to add nothing to the effect of im-
personation so far as the question of transfer of the property is
concerned.112
108 Relying on Shipply v. People, 86 N. Y. 375 (1881).
109 In Damis v. Barcia, 266 App. Div. 698, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 107 (1943) Amols
v. Bernstein was followed, one justice dissenting. In Stanton Motor Corp.
v. Rosetti, 11 App. Div. 2d 296, 203 N. Y. S. 2d 273 (1960) it appeared that
the dishonored check was genuine. The bona fide purchaser was protected,
the court reasoning on the authority of Phelps v. McQuade that the dis-
tinction between void and voidable still maintains for criminal law pur-
poses notwithstanding that larceny and false pretenses are combined in the
statute, and saying "If Damis v. Barcia and Amols v. Bernstein are deemed
to hold otherwise we decline to follow them." See also I-Land Auto Sales
v. Valle, 12 Misc. 2d 1091, 175 N. Y. S. 2d 732 (Mun. Ct., Queens Co., 1958).
In McElroy v. Williams Bros. Motors, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 435, 121 S. E.
2d 917 (1962) it appeared that a buyer in Florida traded in a stolen auto-
mobile, signing the owner's name to register the transfer. It was held that
a bona fide purchaser was not protected. No Florida cases were referred to
but the Florida statute provided: "A person who, with intent to deprive or
defraud the true owner of his property or the use and benefit thereof, or to
appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person: (a)
takes from the possession of the true owner, or of any other person; or
obtains from such person possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false
representation or pretense, or of any false token or writing . . . steals such
property and is guilty of larceny."--Fla. Stat. Ann. § 811.021 quoted by the
court.
The Georgia Code, 26-2602 provides: "Simple theft or larceny is the
wrongful and fraudulent taking and carrying away . . . of the personal
goods of another with intent to steal the same"; and 26-2603 provides:
"Larceny of any automobile shall be a felony." In Hewitt v. Malone, 105
Ga. App. 281, 124 S. E. 2d 501 (1962) where a fictitious name and a "forged"
check were involved it was held that a bona fide purchaser would not be
protected, relying upon Code 26-2602-2603. Compare Blount v. Bainbridge,
79 Ga. App. 99, 122 S. E. 2d 122 (1949).
110 Snyder v. Lincoln, 150 Neb. 580, 35 N. W. 2d 483 (1948); 153 Neb. 611,
45 N. W. 2d 749 (1951); Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So. 2d 477 (1957).
III Martin v. Green, 117 Me. 138, 102 Atl. 977 (1918). In Cowan v. Thomp-
son, 25 Tenn. App. 130, 152 S. W. 2d 1036 (1941), commented on in 17 Tenn.
L. Rev. 272 (1942) it was said that a forged check is stronger than a merely
worthless check. Tennessee has held the full conditional view where a
worthless check is given for the price. See supra, text at note 55. The
forged instrument is void in respect to the person whose name was forged.
See N. I. L. § 23. See also Uniform Commercial Code, 8-202, 205.
112 See further on the topic of bad checks for the price of goods: Collins,
Title to Goods paid for by Worthless Check, 15 So. Cal. L. Rev. 340 (1940);
Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales-"Substantially Simultaneous" and Con-
flicting Analogies-1 Hast. L. J. 112 (1950); Cowan, Cash Sales, Worthless
Checks, and the Bona Fide Purchaser, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 55 (1956); Com-
ment, Worthless Checks in Cash Sales: Rights of the Bona Fide Purchaser,
24 Albany L. Rev. 195 (1960).
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